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Chinese and Indian Military Modernization: 
An Asian Arms Race?
Eric Gomez
inTroducTion
The states of  India and China have experi-enced massive economic growth over the last three decades, which has produced a 
commensurate growth in political power and status 
in the international community. One natural conse-
quence of  a stronger economy and greater political 
power is the development of  a modern military to 
both protect the homeland and exert more influence 
abroad. Both India and China have been engaged 
in significant military modernization programs since 
their economies “took off,” and over the last dec-
ade many new weapons systems have been either 
acquired or developed by both states as a result of 
their newfound wealth. 
As both India and China acquire sophisticated and 
modern militaries, there is a concern that the two 
states are entering an arms race. An arms race “is 
a reciprocal process in which two (or more) states 
build up military capabilities in response to each 
other” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2012, 57). The 
political consequences of  an arms race include the 
erosion of  confidence, the reduction of  coopera-
tion, and a heightened risk of  warfare. Before the 
outbreak of  World War I there was a significant na-
val arms race in Europe, which exacerbated existing 
tensions between the states and contributed to the 
start of  the war (Till 2013). Arms races make the in-
ternational system fraught with risk and often result 
in warfare between powerful states. 
The possibility of  an arms race existing between 
India and China is especially dangerous given their 
history of  armed conflict and mutual distrust. How-
ever, there is cause to hope that the ongoing military 
modernization in India and China is not an arms 
race, but a “natural” development as a result of  the 
increasing economic and political power of  both 
states. Technological development of  weapons sys-
tems is occurring at a very steady pace with no state 
frantically trying to rush development and outdo the 
other. Policymakers are also purposely avoiding us-
ing terms like “getting ahead” and other arms race 
rhetoric (Till 2013). Another important piece of  the 
arms race puzzle is threat perception. States do not 
engage in arms races against states that they do not 
deem to be a credible threat. Even though the pre-
sent relationship between India and China is not 
perfectly balanced or without mistrust, there is no 
sense of  an immediate threat. If  the political and 
military elite of  both states are able to continue basic 
cooperation, then the chance of  an arms race break-
ing out will be significantly reduced. 
This paper is broken into four major sections. First, 
the history of  Sino-Indian relations since 1949, by 
which time both states had adopted the political or-
ganizational forms that they have today, is briefly 
outlined. This section is further divided into three 
subsections: the period before the Sino-Indian War 
of  1962, the aftermath and effects of  the war on 
both India and China, and the long-term conse-
quences and lingering mistrust that affect both states 
today. Second, India’s modernization program is ex-
amined, with emphasis on the development of  their 
nuclear triad and their complicated military acquisi-
tion process. Third, China’s military modernization 
program is examined. Major new weapons systems 
such as the Liaoning aircraft carrier, DF-21 ballistic 
missile, and Y-20 transport plane, and the impact 
these new systems have on Chinese military strategy 
and foreign policy are discussed. 
Finally, the paper concludes with an argument for 
why India and China are not engaged in an arms 
race. While the two states do have an interest in 
building up military power, they do not view one an-
other as their primary threats and are not engaged 
in an arms race that attempts to radically upset the 
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current balance of  power. The absence of  an arms 
race between India and China takes away one ma-
jor source of  potential instability in Asia. Hopefully, 
the Sino-Indian relationship will continue to deepen 
and improve. A positive relationship between the 
two rising Asian powers would go a long way toward 
ensuring a peaceful twenty-first century.
a brief hiSTory of Sino-indian 
relaTionS
The history of  Sino-Indian relations can be divided 
into two distinct periods. The first period, lasting 
from 1949–1962, was characterized by a strong de-
sire on the part of  the Indian and Chinese political 
leadership for cooperation and close relations. The 
second period, beginning in 1963 and lasting to the 
present, saw a rapid deterioration in relations, clos-
er Chinese cooperation with Pakistan, and a deep-
seated feeling of  mistrust between India and China. 
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was the primary cause of 
the dramatic shift in relations. While there have been 
some signs of  improvement in relations—especially 
economic partnership—, feelings of  mistrust and 
suspicion still exist at the highest levels of  govern-
ment and military in both states, as well as among 
the populace. In order to decrease the likelihood of 
armed conflict, both states must work toward ad-
dressing the lingering suspicions of  one another. 
Sino-indian relaTionS before 
1962: cooperaTion and chineSe 
encroachmenT
When India gained independence from Great Brit-
ain in 1947 and Mao Zedong declared the formation 
of  the People’s Republic of  China (PRC) in October 
1949, both countries shared several historical experi-
ences. Both had been controlled by Western colonial 
powers, both had mostly rural and agrarian econ-
omies, and both had experienced painful internal 
strife and political division. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s 
first prime minister, was aware of  these similarities 
and believed that the two countries could work to-
gether. He “articulate[d] a vision of  two civilizations 
co-operating to end balance-of-power politics and 
assisting in the emancipation of  other regions af-
flicted by colonialism” (Joshi 2011b, 85). 
This belief  was promoted throughout the 1950s 
through two major events. First, in 1954 India and 
China agreed to the Panchseel Agreement, a joint 
declaration that advocated five principles of  coex-
istence: mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-
aggression, noninterference in each other’s internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-
existence (Devotta 2010, 100). Panchseel was part of 
a larger agreement on Tibet called the Agreement 
Between the Republic of  India and the People’s Re-
public of  China on Trade and Intercourse between 
the Tibet Region of  China and India (Rowland 1967, 
85).  Nehru was particularly excited about the five 
principles, and was outspoken in claiming them to 
be a major positive step in Sino-Indian relations. 
Second, in 1955, Nehru and Chinese Premier Chou 
En-Lai attended the Bandung Conference, which 
was a major event in the start of  the Non-Aligned 
Movement during the Cold War that included repre-
sentatives from many African and Asian countries. 
There they were able to get a stamp of  approval 
for the Panchseel Agreement from other countries 
(Sandhu 1988, 98). The Bandung Conference was 
seen as a major success in Sino-Indian relations. 
It “produced a kind of  euphoria that glossed over 
the cracks of  Sino-Indian difficulties” (Patil 2007, 
287). Nehru was very pleased at the progress made 
in strengthening Sino-Indian relations. The slogan 
“Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” which literally means “In-
dians and Chinese are brothers,” was used to sum up 
the belief  among the Indian political elite that China 
was a natural partner for cooperation and could be 
trusted (Patil 2007, 286).
India’s desire to find common ground and cooperate 
with China was outwardly reciprocated. However, 
China took military actions near the Indian border 
that ran contrary to the idea of  Hindi Chini Bhai 
Bhai. Two actions in particular signaled China’s in-
tent to seize territory that was claimed by India. In 
1950, China invaded and annexed Tibet. With Tibet 
under Chinese control, a large geographic and stra-
tegic buffer between India and China was removed, 
putting India as a geographic neighbor to China 
(Wang 2011, 449). Control of  Tibet allowed China 
place troops on India’s doorstep. Patil asserts that 
Nehru had “misjudged Chinese intentions…(and) 
did not anticipate Chinese actions on Tibet” (2007, 
287). The India/PRC Agreement on Tibet of  1954, 
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mentioned previously, was created to deal with the 
Tibet issue. Under the agreement, India recognized 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet and China allowed 
existing trade and pilgrimage rights to be maintained 
(Clark 1968, 44). In terms of  security concerns, the 
most important part of  the 1954 agreement was In-
dia’s formal abandonment of  its position that Tibet 
should remain autonomous (Rowland 1967, 85). 
The removal of  the Tibetan buffer should have been 
seen as a major provocation on the part of  the Chi-
nese, but Nehru was reluctant to increase military 
readiness. 
The second hostile action that China took was the 
construction of  a network of  roads along the Indian 
border. These roads would allow the People’s Liber-
ation Army (PLA) forces to rapidly deploy and sus-
tain operations against the Indian military. By 1959, 
India discovered that one such road went through 
the Aksai Chin region, which was claimed by India 
as a part of  Kashmir (Devotta 2010, 100). The con-
struction of  the Aksai Chin road signaled two trou-
bling facts about Sino-India relations, “First that In-
dia was not in effective control of  some territory…
[second] China was in no mood to oblige its friendly 
neighbor”(Patil 2007, 289). B.N. Mullik, then Direc-
tor of  India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), claimed that 
despite knowing about the Aksai Chin road, the gov-
ernment did not take any extra precautions to secure 
positions in the area (Mullik 1971, 239).
The reasons for China’s actions close to the Indian 
border were rooted in two issues. First, the Chinese 
government strongly opposed a border agreement 
that was reached when India was under British colo-
nial control, which gave India control of  land con-
sidered to be part of  Tibet. In 1914, the McMahon 
line separating British India from Tibet was drawn 
and agreed upon by Britain, Tibet, and China (Wang 
2011, 448). Along the border of  Tibet and the In-
dian state of  Arunachal Pradesh lies the town of 
Tawang. China claimed that the town and the area 
around it was once a part of  Tibet, but according to 
the McMahon line, Tawang was on the Indian side 
of  the border. However, China’s claim extended be-
yond just the town. According to Wang:
The Chinese argue that Tawang is a 
Tibetan territory, and because Tibet 
is considered part of  China, the entire 
Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. 
(2011, 452-453) 
India refused to bend on the border question and 
asserted that the McMahon line was an accurate and 
legitimate international boundary. However, the In-
dian government was unwilling to augment its mili-
tary capabilities to mount an effective defense of  its 
claim. Not enough members of  the Indian military 
and political leadership perceived China’s assertions 
regarding Arunachal Pradesh as a serious threat, 
which contributed to the Indian military’s poor state 
of  readiness when war did break out in 1962 (Patil 
2007, 288–289). 
The second cause of  aggressive Chinese actions 
along the Indian border was the Indian govern-
ment’s support for the Tibetan government in exile. 
In March 1959, a Tibetan uprising against Chinese 
occupation resulted in the exile of  the Dalai Lama, 
the spiritual leader of  Tibetan Buddhists and Ti-
bet’s most important political figure, to India (Wang 
2011, 450). One year later, Nehru offered the city 
of  Dharamsala as a base of  operations for the Ti-
betan government in exile. This put intense strain 
on Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese government 
viewed India’s sheltering of  the Dalai Lama and the 
Tibetan government in exile to be a “root cause of 
the 1962 war” (Malik 2011, 76). Indian support for 
the Tibetan government in exile and the question of 
the border drawn by the McMahon Line were the 
two primary political disputes that led to the 1962 
Sino-Indian War.  
From 1960–1962, relations between India and China 
rapidly deteriorated. After 1959, the Chinese gov-
ernment became more hostile in its relations with 
India. Hostile actions taken by the Chinese included: 
a propaganda war against India, demands for self-
determination for Kashmir, and the provision of  aid 
and asylum to Naga and Mizo insurgents (Patil 2007, 
288). There was also a belief  among the Chinese po-
litical leadership that the governments of  the United 
States and India were conspiring against Chinese in-
terests. Military force was seen as necessary to foil 
the conspiracy (Malik 2011, 77–78). 
The Indian government also took actions that put 
strain on the relationship. In an April 1960 visit to 
India, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai offered a pro-
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posal to Nehru in which China would drop its ter-
ritorial claim to Arunachal Pradesh if  India gave up 
its claim to the Aksai Chin This swap “would have 
given each country legal right to territory already in 
its possession” (Garver 2006, 104). Nehru refused 
to accept the proposal and insisted that China give 
up claims to both Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai 
Chin. Instead of  accepting Zhou’s offer and cooling 
off  tension between the two states, Nehru’s choice 
to become more confrontational over the border 
dispute put undue strain on relations between India 
and China. John Garver argues: 
both sides bear onus for the 1962 war, 
China for misconstruing India’s Tibetan 
policies, and India for pursuing a con-
frontational policy on the border. (2006, 
87)
The 1962 Sino-indian war and iTS 
afTermaTh
The worsening relationship between India and Chi-
na came to a head on October 20, 1962 when the 
PLA launched a massive ground assault at several 
points along the Indian border. According to Wang, 
small skirmishes between Chinese and Indian sol-
diers along the border had been occurring for sev-
eral years before the outbreak of  war, but these 
clashes were never significant enough to prompt the 
Indian government to adequately fortify their posi-
tions (2011, 450). The PLA possessed a massive nu-
merical advantage over the Indians, outnumbering 
them five-to-one, and caught the Indians completely 
off  guard (Devotta 2010, 100). Unsurprisingly, the 
Chinese military was able to rapidly advance into 
the disputed territories and establish control over 
them. Indian positions in the Ladakh region of 
the Aksai Chin and border outposts in Arunachal 
Pradesh were almost immediately overrun in coor-
dinated attacks (Rowland 1967, 166). In total, some 
14,670 square kilometers of  Indian territory were 
taken over by Chinese forces (Devotta 2010, 100). 
The Indian military was badly defeated because it 
lacked readiness and the proper equipment. As men-
tioned earlier, the Indian government did not per-
ceive an open war with China as a possibility and was 
therefore not prepared for the invasion. There were 
simply not enough Indian military units that were 
both trained and equipped to fight in the mountains 
where most of  the fighting in the war took place 
(Patil 2007, 291–292). Despite their rapidly deterio-
rating relationship with China from 1960–1962, the 
Indian government failed to improve security along 
their border and suffered greatly for it. 
Thankfully for the Indian military, the 1962 Sino-In-
dian War ended almost as suddenly as it began. On 
November 21, 1962, almost exactly one month after 
the start of  the war, the Chinese government an-
nounced a ceasefire and ordered its troops to retreat 
back into China to positions 20 kilometers behind 
the original border (Hobday 1982, 256). Despite the 
short duration of  the war, Indian losses, in terms of 
both territory and life, were massive. Well over 1,000 
Indian soldiers were killed and many more were in-
jured, and 2,000 square miles of  northern Kashmir 
were given to China as part of  a 1963 agreement 
between China and Pakistan (Devotta 2010, 100). 
The defeat also had intangible impacts on the In-
dian psyche and national attitude. The crushing de-
feat that India suffered marked “a huge setback in 
India’s confidence and international standing and 
tilted the regional power balance in China’s favor” 
(Malik 2011, 79). For the rest of  the Cold War, In-
dia “embark[ed] on a ‘self-help’ strategy designed to 
guarantee its security.” (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 
5) 
India’s defeat to China led to several important im-
mediate changes to foreign and military policy. First, 
the Indian government dramatically increased the 
amount of  money spent on defense. From 1960–
1962, when the Sino-Indian relationship began to 
deteriorate, defense spending as a percent of  na-
tional revenue declined from 28% in 1960–1961 
to 24.9% in 1961–1962 (Brecher 1968, 151). This 
spending decrease was tied to Nehru’s belief  that 
China was not a threat: 
Nehru was content once India had 
gained relative supremacy over Pakistan 
and did not pay attention to meeting the 
challenges posed by China. (Patil 2007, 
291) 
This trend changed after the war. Net defense ex-
penditure in 1962–1963 was $948.81 million USD, 
an increase of  36% from 1961–1962 net expendi-
ture ($608.03 million) and an increase of  45% from 
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1960–1961 net expenditure ($519.86 million). (Patil 
2007, 291) 
Second, the Indian government began develop-
ing a nuclear strike capability to serve as a deter-
rent against another Chinese attack. In 1964, China 
successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. At the 
time, the Indian military was still recovering from its 
defeat two years earlier and a second invasion was 
seen by the Indian political and military elite as a real 
possibility (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 98). Because 
of  the need for conventional rearmament and the 
embarrassment of  1962, the Indian military did not 
actively pursue the nuclear option. Instead, the civil-
ian leadership took the lead on the program (Cohen 
and Dasgupta 2010, 98). In 1974, India successfully 
tested a nuclear device but not a truly functioning 
weapon. 
Third, for over a decade after the war, the Sino-Indi-
an relationship was put on hold. There was a general 
lack of  political engagement between the two states, 
and India viewed China with a high degree of  mis-
trust. From 1962–1976 there was neither a Chinese 
ambassador in New Delhi nor an Indian ambassa-
dor in Beijing (Wang 2011, 450). During this time 
period, both states cultivated diplomatic relation-
ships with other states. China approached Pakistan 
as a major regional ally in the hopes that a strong 
Pakistan would be able to confine India’s growing 
power and geopolitical interests (Wang 2011, 457). 
The Pakistani government officially recognized the 
Aksai Chin as Chinese territory, and in 1963 it ceded 
a portion of  Kashmir to the Chinese (Devotta 2010, 
112). The Chinese government came to Pakistan’s 
aid in 1965, when it threatened “dire consequences” 
against India should the Indian military push too far 
into Kashmir (Watson 2002, 15–16). Meanwhile, In-
dia cultivated a closer relationship with the United 
States and, after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the 
Soviet Union, which had broken off  friendly rela-
tions with China after the Sino-Soviet split in the 
early 1960s (Malik 2011, 79). 
lingering miSTruST and aTTempTS aT 
cooperaTion
From the 1970s onwards, Sino-Indian relations have 
been characterized by a sense of  mistrust and sus-
picion. Many Chinese military and political leaders 
view India as a rival trying to assert its dominance 
over South Asia, while the Indian leadership still re-
members the Chinese “betrayal” of  1962 and views 
China’s involvement in the Indian Ocean and its 
close relationship with Pakistan with concern. How-
ever, there have also been several important steps 
made over the last two decades to bring the two 
states closer together both economically and mili-
tarily. Recent military exchanges and joint training 
exercises could indicate the beginning of  increased 
cooperation and a return to friendly relations. 
The reestablishment of  diplomatic contact in 1976 
was a major step in returning a sense of  normalcy 
to relations. The death of  Mao Zedong in 1976 and 
the rise of  Deng Xiaoping played an important role 
in improving Sino-Indian relations. Deng wanted to 
rapidly improve China’s economy to bring it into the 
ranks of  the developed states by 2000 (Dreyer 2012, 
116). A peaceful external environment was seen as 
an important prerequisite for domestic economic 
development. The Chinese government needed to 
normalize relations with its neighbors in order to 
successfully implement Deng’s ambitious moderni-
zation plan (Al-Rfouh 2003, 24). Not everyone in 
the Chinese government approved of  Deng’s deci-
sion to reengage with India. Military hardliners and 
CCP leaders in Tibet and the Yunnan province were 
suspicious that the Indian government would pro-
vide support to ethnic minorities in Chinese terri-
tory (Holslag 2009, 43).
High-level diplomatic exchanges followed the es-
tablishment of  formal relations. However, these ex-
changes and contacts did not significantly improve 
bilateral relations. In March 1978, a Chinese delega-
tion visited New Delhi. In February 1979, Atal Bi-
hari Vajpayee, India’s foreign minister, visited China. 
These visits and others like them “initiated the pro-
cess of  normalization of  relations between India and 
China”(Al-Rfouh 2003, 24). Soon after these initial 
visits, rounds of  talks between Indian and Chinese 
government officials began that aimed to solve the 
border dispute that led to the 1962 war. These talks 
dragged on throughout the 1980s with no tangible 
results, due to several major setbacks (Al-Rfouh 
2003, 24–25). In 1986, after the failure of  the sev-
enth round of  talks, the Indian Parliament granted 
statehood to Arunachal Pradesh (Malik 2011, 85). 
Chinese and Indian troops were mobilized along the 
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border after the act was passed, and there were me-
dia reports of  armed skirmishes that could have led 
to another war (Holslag 2009, 43). The late 1970s 
and 1980s saw a reestablishment of  diplomatic ties 
between India and China, but the two states were 
unable to reach a settlement on the border issue that 
caused their relationship to collapse in the first place. 
During the 1990s, promising signs for cooperation 
began to emerge in economic relations and trade. 
In the early 1990s, Indian Finance Minister Manmo-
han Singh initiated significant reforms that helped 
fuel an economic boom. The need for economic re-
form was spurred by an impending economic crisis 
caused by Operation Desert Storm (spike in oil pric-
es) and the end of  the Cold War (loss of  the East-
ern European market) (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 
11–12). Singh’s reform measures included cutting 
tariffs, reducing restrictions on private enterprise, 
and encouraging foreign direct investment into the 
economy (Adams and Kirk 2010, 144). The reforms 
were very successful, and have served as the base for 
India’s rapid economic rise that has continued into 
the twenty-first century. From 2005–2010, India’s 
economy grew at an average annual rate of  8.5% 
and was able to maintain a 7% annual growth rate af-
ter the 2008 global financial crisis (Sharma 2010, 77). 
The mutual success of  the Indian and Chinese econ-
omies has produced several positive steps towards 
friendly Sino-Indian relations. In 1992, consulates 
were reopened in Mumbai and Shanghai, two grow-
ing centers of  international trade. One year later in 
June, economic memoranda were signed that en-
couraged trade between the two states by reducing 
double taxation in bilateral trade (Holslag 2009, 44). 
Economic cooperation was initially very limited, the 
1993 memoranda placed a limit of  $160 billion USD 
in total trade and only $3 million USD in invest-
ment, but it broadened throughout the 1990s and 
2000s (Holslag 2009, 44). Two-way trade between 
India and China reached $52 billion in 2008, and 
two years later China became India’s largest trading 
partner (Devotta 2010, 111). However, the trade re-
lationship between India and China does not equally 
benefit both states. India is running a massive trade 
deficit. In 2010, bilateral trade was valued at $61.7 
billion USD, but Chinese exports to India represent 
$40.8 billion of  total bilateral trade (Krishnan 2011). 
Despite closer economic and diplomatic ties, there 
are two aspects of  the Sino-Indian relationship that 
remain contentious: the relationship between Paki-
stan and China, and media sources that encourage 
mutual mistrust. As mentioned earlier, the relation-
ship between Pakistan and China began in 1963, 
when Pakistan ceded a portion of  the Aksai Chin 
to China (Devotta 2010, 112). Since the early 1960s, 
the Pakistani military has greatly benefitted from its 
relationship with China. Despite the close defense 
relationship between the United States and Pakistan 
since 9/11, China remains Pakistan’s largest supplier 
of  weapons, with Chinese-made weapons account-
ing for nearly 70% of  Pakistan’s military hardware 
(Malik 2011, 181–182). 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has also re-
ceived massive support from the Chinese govern-
ment. The Chinese government first gave Pakistan 
nuclear “know-how and technology” sometime in 
the late 1980s or early 1990s (Devotta 2010, 114). 
Initially, the support was intended to be for the de-
velopment of  civilian nuclear power plants (Watson 
2002, 28). The Chinese government has continued 
to support Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, 
providing Islamabad with nuclear bombs, uranium, 
missiles, and the plants used to make the weapons 
(Malik 2011, 182). Chinese support for Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program is seen as a major threat 
by the Indian government and military given the 
long history of  conflict between India and Pakistan. 
The final military development that has hindered 
closer Sino-Indian relations has been the construc-
tion of  the “String of  Pearls,” a series of  port facili-
ties in South Asian states near India. Since 2000, Chi-
nese funding has secured access to ports in Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Wang 2011, 
451). The new port at Gwadar, Pakistan is especially 
worrying to the Indian government. The Pakistani 
government has made statements that it is willing to 
station Chinese troops at the facility, and Gwadar’s 
status as a natural deep-sea port opens up the pos-
sibility of  Chinese nuclear-armed submarines being 
stationed close to India after many years of  acrimo-
ny, chronic mistrust, and squandered opportunities 
(Rehman 2012, 76). Fears of  mass terrorism in the 
wake of  September 11 and subsequent revelations 
of  extensive proliferation emanating from Pakistan 
added urgency to Western desires to preserve a mod-
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icum of  crisis stability in South Asia, as well as to 
prevent any form of  escalatory behavior that could 
spiral into nuclear conflict or further the spread of 
radioactive material. Since the beginning of  the Cold 
War, the quest for a nuclear deterrent has frequently 
been viewed as an imperative for second-rank pow-
ers desirous of  maintaining a degree of  strategic 
autonomy with respect to prospective adversaries 
that have vast nuclear or conventional superiority. 
Chinese government officials and corporations have 
claimed that these facilities exist solely to support 
trade security and expand Chinese presence in new 
markets (Bajaj 2010). However, Indian defense of-
ficials fear that the Indian Navy’s ability to maintain 
military dominance over the Indian Ocean will be 
eroded by these facilities (Pandya, Herbert-Burns, 
and Kobayashi 2011, 22).  In response to Chinese 
involvement in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy 
has sought out other states that could help bolster its 
power. These include the states of  Vietnam, South 
Korea, and Japan, as well as the United States. The 
Indian Navy’s relationship with the United States 
Navy has become very deep. “India now conducts 
more naval exercises with America than with any 
other country” (The Economist 2013). 
The second major roadblock to close Sino-Indian 
relations is mutual hostility on the part of  the media. 
India’s defeat in the 1962 war had a strong detrimen-
tal effect on its national psyche:
A “victim mentality” persists to this day 
in India, “which plays [an] integral role 
in defining Sino-Indian threat percep-
tions. (Saalman 2011b, 174)
This victim mentality plays out over the Internet 
today, with private media outlets making fantastic 
claims such as claiming that the Chinese wanted to 
build an astronomical observatory in the Askai Chin 
in an attempt to solidify its territorial claim (Ban-
yan 2012). Indian media have also sensationalized 
the threat posed by China by launching what Beijing 
considers to be 
an aggressive anti-China campaign… 
over disputed borders, Tibet, UN re-
forms, unfair trade practices, terrorism, 
and nuclear issues. (Malik 2011, 104) 
Chinese bloggers have also been inflammatory in 
recent years, making statements that China could 
break up the “Great Indian Federation” by taking 
very little action (Banyan 2012). This kind of  aggres-
sive language has spread to Chinese strategic journals 
and pro-Beijing Hong Kong media. In early 2006, 
these news sources “published commentaries dis-
cussing the possibilities of  a ‘limited border war’ to 
‘teach India a lesson again’” (Malik 2011, 102). One 
possible solution to the raging media war could be 
a broader exchange of  journalists between the two 
states. There are only four Indian reporters based 
in China, and very few Chinese reporters based in 
India (Banyan 2012). Having a free exchange of 
journalists might help de-sensationalize Sino-Indian 
relations to the general public in both states, which 
could lead to better bilateral relations.
The Sino-Indian relationship in the aftermath of  the 
1962 war has been characterized by a slow but steady 
normalization of  relations. The decades following 
the reestablishment of  diplomatic ties in 1976 saw 
little progress in resolving the border dispute that 
led to the 1962 war, but the mere fact that negotia-
tions took place was a major step forward in bilateral 
relations. The most promising area of  cooperation 
has been economic partnership. China has become 
India’s largest trading partner, although a large trade 
deficit still exists in China’s favor. Roadblocks to 
normalization include China’s support for Pakistan’s 
armed forces and nuclear program, the “String of 
Pearls,” and a media war that is characterized by mis-
information and sensationalized stories. Sino-Indian 
relations are still far from being completely normal-
ized, but if  both states continue to build on the work 
that has been done over the last 30 years then a posi-
tive, stable relationship between India and China 
could be a reality. 
india’S miliTary modernizaTion 
and iTS effecT on foreign policy
The Indian military’s modernization process has 
focused on force projection. The Indian Navy and 
Air Force have either purchased or developed many 
new weapons systems that enable them to fight fur-
ther from home. As of  2009, the Indian Navy was 
the fifth largest in the world with 145 ships. This 
number is projected to increase to over 160 ships by 
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2022 (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 82–83). 
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force has been acquir-
ing advanced fighter aircraft like the Dassault Ra-
fale as well as support aircraft, like the C-17 heavy-
lift transport plane.  However, unlike the Chinese 
military, which has domestically produced most of 
its newest equipment, the Indian military is a ma-
jor arms importer. In 2006, India surpassed China 
to become the largest arms importer in the world 
by dollar value (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, fig. 
1–1). The Indian military has continued to be the 
world’s largest arms importer. From 2007-2011, it 
purchased over $21 billion worth of  weapons from 
foreign states (The Economist 2013). As of  2012, 
“India continues to import approximately 70% of 
its military hardware and produces only 30%” (Latif 
and Lombardo 2012, 25). The development of  a 
strong domestic defense industry is both essential 
for national security and necessary for India to be-
come a major military power. 
The modernizaTion of The indian 
miliTary
The economic reforms that were implemented in 
the early 1990s by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 
and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh produced 
a windfall that led to a substantial increase on de-
fense spending. Brisk economic growth, coupled 
with dangerous political-military events like the 1999 
Kargil crisis and the 2001 terrorist attack on Parlia-
ment, encouraged the Indian government to spend 
more on defense (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 
2009, 80). Since 2000, there has been a “74% real-
term increase in India’s defense spending” (Latif 
and Lombardo 2012, 5). This amounted to a budget 
of  about $40.8 billion for the 2012 fiscal year. The 
only other Asian states that spend more on defense 
than India are China and Japan. As of  2010, Indi-
an defense spending was almost equal to Japanese 
defense spending, but China was by far the biggest 
spender in Asia (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, fig. 1). 
In March 2013, the Chinese government announced 
that it would raise its defense budget by 10.7% to a 
total of  $114.3 billion, almost three times as much as 
the Indian government spent in 2012 (Zhou 2013). 
A breakdown of  the Indian defense budget re-
veals valuable information about the modernization 
process. The segment of  the budget that is most 
concerned with military modernization is the capi-
tal outlay account, which is used for the procure-
ment of  equipment and other materials for the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force (Latif  and Lombardo 
2012, 7). The 2012–2013 military budget included 
a 15% increase in the capital outlay account from 
Rs 69,198.81 crore to Rs 79,578.63 crore (Behera 
2012). Taken together, the Navy and Air Force ac-
count for almost 70% of  the capital outlay budget 
for 2012–2013. Around 89% of  the total capital out-
lay account was earmarked for modernization. The 
Indian Navy has emerged as the leading force in the 
military’s modernization and the 2012-2013 budget 
reflects this. The Navy received a 72% increase in its 
modernization budget, while the Air Force’s mod-
ernization budget only increased by 0.5% (Behera 
2012). The Indian Army “has long been the ben-
eficiary to the largest portion of  India’s defense ex-
penditure” (Saalman 2011a, 97). However, most of 
the money budgeted for the Army is not earmarked 
for modernization. The capital outlay budget of  the 
Indian military reveals a clear preference for the Air 
Force and Navy, the two branches most responsible 
for projecting force away from the homeland. 
While the Indian government has approved more 
and more spending on the modernization of  the 
armed forces, it has purposely made the acquisitions 
process grindingly slow. Simply put, 
India’s defense bureaucracy has histori-
cally showed an inability to spend all of 
its defense budget…especially in the 
capital outlay account. (Latif  and Lom-
bardo 2012, 9) 
Since 2005, there has been chronic underspend-
ing in the capital outlay account, which is used for 
modernization, and overspending in the revenue ac-
count, which is used for paying salaries and other 
“day-to-day” expenses. This underspending prob-
lem is rooted in the Bofors scandal of  1989 in which 
Indian defense officials were accused of  taking kick-
backs from Bofors, a Swedish artillery company, in 
return for awarding contracts to Bofors (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 11). In October 2006, A.K. Antony 
was appointed as India’s defense minister “to ensure 
that no Bofors-like scandal occurs within the De-
fense Ministry” (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 18). An-
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tony’s scrupulous approach to fighting corruption 
has led to significant acquisition delays that have 
put the brakes on the military’s efforts to modern-
ize. Unfortunately, it is not clear that this increased 
scrutiny has actually reduced corruption (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 18–19). The Indian military must 
figure out a way to stop underspending in the capital 
account in order to ensure that military moderniza-
tion continues at a steady pace. 
The Indian Navy, the primary driver of  the mod-
ernization process, has focused on creating a larger 
fleet without sacrificing quality, while also purchas-
ing support items such as maritime patrol and car-
rier-launched fighter aircraft. In 2012, the Indian 
Navy’s ship inventory stood at around 150 ships of 
all sizes, with 38 principle combatants (destroyers, 
frigates, carriers, etc.) (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
71). Over the course of  the next decade or two, the 
fleet will first shrink in size to around 70 ships, as 
obsolete ships are scrapped before bouncing back to 
200 ships (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 11). So far, the 
modernization process has mostly involved the pur-
chase of  foreign-made weapons systems. Between 
1997 and 2000, the navy ordered two Kilo-class sub-
marines and three frigates from Russia (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 90). The most significant purchase 
from Russia, however, has been the Vikramaditya (ex-
Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier. The Vikramaditya, 
first launched in 1982, is supposed to replace the 
1950s-era Viraat, India’s only other aircraft carrier 
(Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 83). Unfor-
tunately, the purchase has been beset with problems, 
including a delivery delay and an increase in Russia’s 
asking price for retrofitting the vessel (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 90). 
The Indian Navy has not been completely reliant on 
other states for its modernization needs. The most 
important domestically made addition to the fleet 
is the Arihant, a nuclear-powered submarine that is 
the product of  a collaboration between the Indian 
Navy, Larsen & Toubro, and Russia (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 90–91). The Arihant was launched 
in 2009 and is undergoing sea trials after successfully 
completing harbor trials in 2012. Once the Arihant 
is fully operational, India will join the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Russia, and China as the only 
states with an underwater launch system for nuclear 
missiles (Subramranian and Mallikarjun 2012). The 
Indian government has approved funding for four 
additional nuclear submarines like the Arihant (In-
gersoll 2012). Despite the success in building and 
testing the Arihant, the state of  India’s shipyards is 
a mixed bag. On the plus side for the Indian Navy, 
Indian shipyards have been growing in 
number and capacity and are slowly re-
placing many of  the aging platforms for 
the Indian navy’s growing global role.
(Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 11)
The modernization of  the fleet is filling three major 
shipyards, which are producing two aircraft carriers, 
three destroyers, one large amphibious warfare ves-
sel, and many other ships with more approved and 
ready to be built (Till 2012, 93). Unfortunately, many 
of  these vessels won’t be completed for some time. 
India’s fleet modernization may take much longer 
than planned because India’s shipyards are only able 
to deliver about one unit per year (Till 2012, 93–94). 
The Indian Navy has acquired many ships in recent 
years and is on its way toward a larger and more 
modern fleet, but this modernization process may 
take a long time to come to fruition unless India’s 
shipyards can increase the rate of  production. 
While the Indian Navy had the largest increase in its 
modernization budget, the Indian Air Force (IAF) 
has gotten the most money for modernization over 
the last ten years. From 2002–2012, the IAF has re-
ceived over 30% of  the capital outlay budget; this 
peaked at 41% of  the budget for 2010–2012 (Lom-
bardo 2011, fig. 2). The large amount of  money 
needed for the IAF’s modernization has to do with 
the high cost of  aircraft and the rapid pace of  tech-
nological development. The IAF is in a technology 
trap because it “is caught between the enormous ex-
pansion of  relevant technology and its astronomical 
costs” (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 83). For exam-
ple, the cost of  a top-of-the-line fighter in 1979 was 
about $8 million per unit, but the cost of  a modern 
top-of-the-line-fighter can be as high as $40 million, 
not to mention the costs associated with maintaining 
the aircraft over several decades (Cohen and Das-
gupta 2010, 83). Despite the large share of  the capi-
tal outlay budget that the IAF receives, it remains 
below full operation strength. The IAF is authorized 
to operate thirty-nine and a half  squadrons and has 
requested an increase to as many as forty-five squad-
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rons (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 11). However, as 
of  2009 it only had enough aircraft for thirty-two 
squadrons (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 83). The fact 
that most modern military aircraft are produced in 
foreign countries compounds their already high cost. 
India’s lack of  a robust domestic defense industry is 
especially noticeable for the IAF, which has had to 
look abroad in its quest to modernize. Most of  the 
IAF’s new fighter aircraft are produced in India but 
based off  of  Russian and European designs. Cur-
rently, the Russian-designed and Indian-produced 
Su-30MKI is the primary air superiority fighter of 
the IAF, with 170 in operation and over 200 more in 
production (Menon 2013). In addition to maintain-
ing air superiority over a hostile air force, the Su-
30MKI gives the IAF a “seeming qualitative edge 
[over the Pakistani Air Force] that may […] translate 
into air superiority in the next war” (Cohen and Das-
gupta 2010, 84). The Su-30MKIs also have the ca-
pability to carry nuclear weapons, making them one 
of  the three legs of  India’s nuclear triad (Saalman 
2011a, 104). The IAF understands the importance 
of  the Su-30MKI’s power projection capabilities and 
in 2009, the number of  Su-30MKIs along the bor-
der with China was increased (Saalman 2011a, 104). 
The other major air force modernization initia-
tive was the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) 
competition, which was launched after the IAF re-
quested a replacement for its aging fighter fleet (Co-
hen and Dasgupta 2010, 86). The American-made 
F/A-18 and F-16 were eliminated from the compe-
tition in April 2011 (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 2). 
In January 2012, the Dassault Rafale was selected as 
the winner of  the competition. The IAF will buy 
eighteen of  the fighters “off  the shelf ” (equivalent 
to one squadron) and will build 108 of  the fight-
ers domestically with foreign assistance for a total 
of  126 fighters (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 86). The 
contract is estimated to be worth $12 billion, but the 
deal could expand to include as many as 220 aircraft 
at a total cost between $25–30 billion over ten years 
(Al Jazeera 2012a). The Su-30MKI and the Rafale 
will provide the IAF with a technological edge and 
could serve as a jump-start to the domestic defense 
industry, as most of  the fighters will be manufac-
tured in India. 
The IAF has also significantly improved its other ca-
pabilities via the purchase of  foreign-made aircraft. 
American companies have had much more success 
in selling non-combat aircraft.  Shortly after making 
the announcement that American fighters would not 
win the MRCA competition, the Indian government 
approved a deal for ten Boeing C-17 cargo aircraft 
worth $4.1 billion (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 3). 
The C-17’s long range (2,785 miles) would give it the 
IAF the ability to airlift troops and supplies through-
out the Indian Ocean region (Cohen and Dasgupta 
2010, 82). The United States has also sold the IAF 
the smaller C-130 transport aircraft. In 2008, the 
IAF bought six C-130s for $962 million and a deal 
for six more C-130s was made in 2011 (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 12–13). Other non-fighter aircraft 
sales to India include the American-made Boe-
ing P-8I Orion, which is used for coastal patrolling 
and anti-submarine warfare, and the Israeli-made 
A-50 Phalcon airborne early warning and control 
(AWEC) aircraft (Saalman 2011a, 103–104). The 
wide range of  capabilities that the modern IAF pos-
sesses greatly enhances its power projection capa-
bilities. However, this new capability has so far been 
dependent on foreign states because India lacks a 
strong defense industry. 
The final major component of  India’s military mod-
ernization is its nuclear forces, specifically the devel-
opment of  a “triad” of  delivery capabilities. Until 
recently, the Indian military only had the air- and 
land-based delivery systems available. The Arihant 
will give the Indian military the third leg of  the triad 
once it is fully operational. In late 2012, the two-
stage K-15 missile, which can be equipped with a 
nuclear warhead, was successfully launched from 
a submerged pontoon. Once the Arihant has com-
pleted all of  its trials, it will be armed with twelve 
K-15 missiles (Subramranian and Mallikarjun 2012). 
The Arihant gives India a second-strike capability to 
respond to a nuclear attack that the other two legs 
of  the triad can’t reliably provide. According to Ad-
miral Nirmal Verma, “[India’s] maritime and nuclear 
doctrines will then be aligned to ensure our nuclear 
insurance come from the sea” (Ingersoll 2012). The 
Indian military’s push for a second-strike capability 
is not without a good reason. In 1995, 
China amended its No-First-Use. (NFU) 
of  nuclear weapons pledge to make it 
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applicable to only nuclear-weapons-free 
zones and to countries that had signed 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
(NPT) …excluding India from its NFU 
pledge. (Malik 2011, 42) 
The Arihant completes India’s nuclear triad by giv-
ing it a mobile launch system that is hard to destroy. 
India now has a virtually guaranteed second-strike 
capability, which significantly enhances its military 
power. 
Strategically, the Arihant was the most significant 
addition to India’s nuclear weapons arsenal, but the 
land and air legs of  India’s triad have also received 
major upgrades since 2000. As mentioned earlier, the 
new Su-30MKI fighter aircraft have the capability to 
be armed with nuclear weapons, a major upgrade 
over the 1970s-era SEPECAT Jaguars and other ag-
ing nuclear delivery aircraft (Cohen and Dasgupta 
2010, 81). The Indian Army operates several classes 
of  ballistic missiles with different ranges. The Agni 
series of  missiles are capable of  hitting many Chi-
nese cities. In April 2012, the latest Agni missile, the 
Agni-V, was successfully test fired. The Agni-V has 
a range of  5,000km, which is enough to hit almost 
every major city in China, Iran, and Southeast Asia 
(Al Jazeera 2012b). Immediately following the test, 
Chinese officials released statements saying that the 
Agni-V was not a serious threat to China. Liu We-
imin, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, said,
We believe that both sides should cher-
ish the hard-won good state of  affairs at 
present, and work hard to uphold friend-
ly strategic cooperation […][and] make 
positive contributions towards main-
taining peace and stability in the region. 
(BBC 2012) 
India’s military modernization has aimed at creating 
a military that can project power further afield with 
conventional and nuclear weapons. The moderniza-
tion and expansion of  the Indian Navy will allow 
the fleet to better patrol the Indian Ocean, which 
is very strategically important. The acquisition of 
modern aircraft like the Dassault Rafale, Su-30MKI, 
and C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft allow the IAF 
to have a fighting advantage over many other air 
forces and gives them the capability to move troops 
and supplies further from home. New nuclear weap-
ons delivery systems like the INS Arihant and Agni-
V ballistic missile have completed India’s nuclear 
triad and have provided the Indian military with a 
viable second-strike capability. However, the Indian 
military’s dependence on foreign states for modern 
weapons technology must be overcome before India 
can reach its full military potential. 
The effecTS of india’S miliTary 
modernizaTion on foreign policy
India’s growing military power has had several last-
ing effects on its foreign policy and how other states 
view India. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the 
Indian government adopted a pragmatic foreign 
policy most in line with the principles of  realist 
international relations theory (Ganguly and Pard-
esi 2009, 4). The Indian government is aware that 
a stronger military allows it to carry more weight 
in regional and international politics. For the most 
part, Indian strategic thinking has stayed regional 
(Ciorciari 2011, 62). The ability to exert influence 
and project power into the Indian Ocean has been 
one of  the most important geopolitical issues for 
the Indian armed forces for many years, but until 
recently it has not possessed the capabilities to back 
up their strategic goals. Military modernization has 
also resulted in changes to Indian relations with for-
eign countries, especially the United States. Finally, 
a modern Indian military could mean a greater role 
for India in maintaining international peace and se-
curity. Piracy and terrorism are security issues that 
affect multiple states and can only be defeated by 
cooperation among many states. A modern navy and 
air force would give India the ability to patrol the 
Indian Ocean and keep South Asia’s sea-lanes open 
to international trade. 
Control of  the Indian Ocean has long been a stra-
tegic imperative for India. Since the 1970s, “Indian 
policy has articulated a suspicion of  the military 
presence of  outsiders in the Indian Ocean” (Pandya, 
Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 22). However, 
throughout most of  its history, India has been con-
fined to a status as a continental power since former 
colonial powers guaranteed the security of  the seas 
until India gained independence in 1947 (Winner 
2012, 105). Throughout the Cold War, the Indian 
navy lacked the necessary capabilities to keep other 
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states out of  the Indian Ocean. Recently, the Amer-
ica, French, and British navies have all been very ac-
tive in the region, but the Indian military does not 
view their presence with suspicion, as most of  their 
operations have been focused on either monitoring 
Iran or combating terrorism (Herbert-Burns 2012, 
43–44). 
Chinese military interest in the Indian Ocean have 
increased as China’s economy and foreign trade 
has increased. Significant Chinese investments and 
trading relationships with countries in East Africa 
such as the Sudan, South Africa, and Tanzania de-
pend on Indian Ocean sea lanes (Pandya, Herbert-
Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 20). In order to protect 
these economic interests, the Chinese government 
has invested money in port facilities in Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh, also known as the “String of 
Pearls.” Additionally, China depends on the Indian 
Ocean for energy imports. In 2002, oil accounted 
for about 20% of  China’s energy consumption. Ap-
proximately half  of  this oil came from Saudi Arabia, 
Angola, and Iran, and was shipped across the Indian 
Ocean (Klare 2002, 110–111). From the oilfields 
of  Saudi Arabia to the Nile delta, from the ship-
ping lanes of  the South China Sea to the pipelines 
of  Central Asia, Resource Wars looks at the growing 
impact of  resource scarcity on the military policies 
of  nations. International security expert Michael T. 
Klare argues that in the early decades of  the new 
millennium, wars will be fought not over ideology 
but over access to dwindling supplies of  precious 
natural commodities. The political divisions of  the 
Cold War, Klare asserts, have given way to a global 
scramble for oil, natural gas, minerals, and water. 
And as armies throughout the world define resource 
security as a primary objective, widespread insta-
bility is bound to follow, especially in those areas 
where competition for essential materials overlaps 
with long-standing territorial and religious disputes. 
In this clarifying view, the recent explosive conflict 
between the United States and Islamic extremism 
stands revealed as the predictable consequence of 
consumer nations seeking to protect the vital re-
sources they depend on. Resource Wars is a much-
needed assessment of  a changed world which takes 
a compelling look at warfare in an era of  rampant 
globalization and intense economic competition. As 
China’s economy has grown, so has its demand for 
oil. While estimates vary, most agree that Chinese oil 
demand will double from 2000 to 2020, with foreign 
sources accounting for 75% of  Chinese demand by 
2020 (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 129). 
Given their contentious past, the Chinese govern-
ment fears that the Indian navy would close Indian 
Ocean sea lanes should the two states come into con-
flict (Gordon 2010, 207). However, Indian military 
leaders are wary of  these facilities and are worried 
about Chinese encirclement of  India (Holmes, Win-
ner, and Yoshihara 2009, 127). This has produced a 
classic security dilemma in the Indian Ocean. The 
Chinese believe that having port facilities and a naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean is vital to their secu-
rity, but the Indian government views these facilities 
as a security threat to India. 
The modernization of  India’s navy has been aimed 
at developing the capability to ensure a qualitative 
and quantitative edge in the Indian Ocean region. 
As mentioned earlier, the navy wants to have a fleet 
of  over 160 ships, three aircraft carriers, and 400 
aircraft by 2020 (Pandya, Herbert-Burns, and Kob-
ayashi 2011, 118). A fleet with three aircraft carriers 
and modern submarines like the Arihant would al-
low India to assert itself  as the dominant power in 
the Indian Ocean (Saalman 2011a, 99–100). India’s 
location next to the Indian Ocean, combined with 
China’s geographic distance from the Indian Ocean, 
will ensure that the Indian navy will always have a 
more significant presence in the region, unless the 
entirety of  the Chinese Navy was moved to the In-
dian Ocean.
The Indian government has used their growing navy 
in a variety of  roles designed to enhance political 
and security partnerships with states that border the 
Indian Ocean. This is manifested by a “Look West” 
policy,
that seeks to pro-actively engage western 
Indian Ocean littoral states…via invest-
ment, trade, aid, and security arrange-
ments. (Malik 2011, 341)
 Since October 2008, Indian Navy ships have been 
deployed to the Gulf  of  Aden and off  the coast of 
Somalia to arrest pirates and prevent piracy attacks 
(Pandya, Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 118). 
India has also signed security pacts with Qatar and 
Oman, and conducts joint naval exercises with Ken-
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ya, Tanzania and South Africa (Malik 2011, 341). 
However, the security environment in other states 
like Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq has placed limits on 
the effectiveness of  the “Look West” policy (Dutta 
2011, 139). India’s “Look West” policy has enjoyed 
initial success, and is both a testament to the grow-
ing power capabilities of  their modernizing navy as 
well as an indication of  India’s desire to cement its 
presence across the Indian Ocean. 
In addition to forming security and political links 
with African and Middle Eastern states, the Indi-
an navy and government has reached out to states 
in Southeast Asia as strategic regional allies. Most 
of  the contact between India and Southeast Asian 
states so far has related to either security or eco-
nomics. Economic partnerships include the signing 
of  a Free Trade Agreement with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2009 and the 
forging of  economic partnerships with Singapore 
and Thailand (Dutta 2011, 139). The Indian military 
has been active in Southeast Asia in a wide variety of 
missions. After the massive 2004 earthquake, “the 
Indian Navy deployed 27 ships and over 5,000 Naval 
personnel in disaster relief  operations […] it was the 
first navy to reach the affected areas” (Pandya, Her-
bert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 118). The Indian 
Navy has also conducted joint exercises with South-
east Asian states, including Indonesia, Thailand, Sin-
gapore, and Burma (Malik 2011, 352). India is using 
its growing navy as a tool to increase its influence on 
both sides of  the Indian Ocean. By conducting dis-
aster relief  operations in Indonesia and conducting 
counter-piracy operations off  the coast of  Somalia, 
the Indian navy is promoting India’s strategic inter-
ests and creating a network of  potential allies across 
the region. 
India’s military modernization has also had a lasting 
effect on its relationships with states far away from 
the Indian Ocean. With the exception of  the Arihant 
submarine and the Agni-V ICBM, most of  India’s 
latest major weapons systems have come from for-
eign states. Russia is India’s preeminent arms part-
ner, with Russian-made weapons accounting for 
77% of  India’s defense imports from 2000–2011 
(Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 14). This relationship 
was first established in the 1970s, when the United 
States moved closer to Pakistan after the Soviet in-
vasion of  Afghanistan in 1979 (Ganguly and Pard-
esi 2009, 10). Part of  closer American–Pakistani ties 
was military support, which caused the Indian gov-
ernment to enter into a closer military relationship 
with the Soviet Union so as to not lose their military 
superiority over a stronger Pakistan (Ganguly and 
Pardesi 2009, 11). Throughout the Cold War, “Rus-
sia was forthcoming with its most advanced military 
hardware” (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 14). During 
the Cold War, a strong strategic relationship devel-
oped between India and the Soviet Union because 
of  American support for Pakistan. 
After the Cold War ended, Russia continued to reign 
supreme in supplying arms to India. In 2000, India 
and Russia signed a strategic partnership, and later 
in the decade the two states “concluded a number of 
pacts for military, technical, and economic coopera-
tion” (Ciorciari 2011, 76–77). Russia is the only state 
that supplies China with advanced weapons and oth-
er essential military hardware like jet engines (Das-
gupta and Cohen 2011, 174). However, its willing-
ness to supply India with top of  the line hardware 
like the Su-30MKI and a refitted aircraft carrier have 
put the Indian military at ease. India’s pursuit of  a 
modern military has deepened its long-standing de-
fense relationship with Russia, which has continued 
to dominate the market for weapons sales to India. 
France has emerged as India’s strongest defense 
partner in Europe. When many states, including the 
United States, condemned India’s 1998 nuclear tests 
and imposed sanctions against India, the French 
government refrained from implementing sanctions 
(Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 14). Several recent po-
litical actions have cemented a strong defense trade 
relationship between France and India. In May 2011, 
the French government decided to cease all sales 
of  heavy military equipment to Pakistan (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 14–15). One month later, Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy announced France’s support 
for India becoming a permanent member of  the UN 
Security Council (“Britain, France Back India’s UN 
Security Council Bid” 2011). The French have also 
been one of  India’s most reliable trading partners in 
the field of  technology transfers, which is an essen-
tial component of  building a stronger domestic de-
fense industry in India (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
149). Most of  the technology transfers from France, 
as well as other major weapons suppliers like Russia, 
has focused more on coproduction of  equipment 
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and maintenance, which helps India keep foreign 
weapons systems functioning but doesn’t help In-
dian companies develop their own equipment (Latif 
and Lombardo 2012, 16). France’s political and 
technological support was rewarded handsomely in 
January 2012, when the Indian military selected the 
French-made Dassault Rafale as the winning fighter 
in the MRCA competition. 
The state that has come the furthest in its relation-
ship with India as a result of  military modernization 
has been the United States. A significant trust defi-
cit existed between India and the United States due 
to American support for Pakistan during the Cold 
War and American hostility towards India’s nuclear 
weapons program (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 28). 
The Indian government’s refusal to sign the NPT 
because:
“it believed the treaty discriminated 
against states without nuclear weapons 
capability and…did nothing to stem nu-
clear proliferation among countries with 
nuclear weapons,” was a particular sore 
spot between the two states. (Devotta 
2010, 114) 
When India tested a nuclear weapon in 1998, the 
United States placed “wide-ranging” sanctions on 
India (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 13). The political 
and security relationship between the United States 
and India during the Cold War and the 1990s was 
characterized by mistrust brought on by diverging 
international security interests. 
The dawn of  the twenty-first century ushered in a 
new international security environment and opened 
up the door for a stronger relationship between the 
United States and India. In 2000, President Bill Clin-
ton visited India, which was the first visit by a sitting 
American president since 1978 (Saalman 2011a, 87). 
Clinton was able to lay the groundwork for improv-
ing bilateral relations. The terrorist attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001 provided the final push necessary 
for India and the United States to fundamentally 
change their relationship. India was the first country 
to come out in support of  the global “War on Ter-
ror” (Devotta 2010, 114). The United States acted 
quickly and “conducted a large scale removal of 
Indian companies from the US Entity List [list of 
companies involved in proliferation]” in late 2001 
(Saalman 2011a, 87). 
In 2005, the United States and India reached a sub-
stantial civilian nuclear deal “which holds the prom-
ise of  ending India’s nuclear isolation” (Ganguly and 
Pardesi 2009, 15). The agreement promised to give 
the Indian government access to nuclear technology 
while allowing the Indian military to keep its nuclear 
weapons. The Indian government pledged to pre-
vent the transfer of  materials between their civilian 
and military nuclear programs, but diffusion of  in-
formation will be hard to stop (Cohen and Dasgupta 
2010, 167). The lifting of  sanctions in 2001 and the 
nuclear deal of  2005 helped repair Indo-American 
relations to the point where significant American 
arms sales to India became a possibility. Since 2002, 
the United States has completed fifteen major arms 
deals with India, valued at approximately $8.83 bil-
lion. This figure only accounts for major conven-
tional hardware like transport aircraft, missiles, and 
the like; it does not include smaller sales like special-
forces equipment and small arms (Latif  and Lom-
bardo 2012, 12–13). 
American arms sales have accompanied more fre-
quent contact between the American military and its 
Indian counterpart. The American and Indian na-
vies have been especially active in joint operations. 
In 2002, they worked together to export high-value 
ships through the Malacca Strait. When major natu-
ral disasters struck Southeast Asia in 2004 and 2008, 
the American and Indian navies provided disaster 
relief  on short notice (Malik 2011, 337). U.S. Navy 
pilots have trained Indian pilots in carrier operations, 
which will be essential as the Indian Navy acquires 
more aircraft carriers (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
174). The United States has become India’s closest 
partner in terms of  joint military exercises (Malik 
2011, 337). These exercises have allowed the two 
militaries to engage in closer defense collaboration. 
Sharing techniques and equipment via arms sales, 
“allows for greater personal interaction between 
militaries, [and] joint training on tactics” (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 21). The growing American de-
fense trade relationship with India has had spillover 
effects in the form of  joint training exercises and en-
hanced interoperability, which will allow Indian and 
American forces to react to crises more effectively. 
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Chinese analysts have been dismissive toward In-
dia’s domestic defense industry, despite the fact that 
the Chinese military has also relied on foreign mili-
tary technology (Saalman 2011a, 98). Despite the 
weaknesses of  India’s defense industry, its growing 
military power has propelled it into the forefront 
of  Chinese strategic thinking. Chinese analysts are 
increasingly de-hyphenating India from Pakistan in 
their writing, indicating that “India’s military mod-
ernization is no longer couched solely within the 
India-Pakistan dynamic” (Saalman 2011b, 93–94). 
The United States has also taken a strategic interest 
in India. This marks a significant change from the 
early days of  the Cold War, when:
the United States was virtually ignorant 
of  India and had few cultural, strategic, 
or economic links with [India]. (Ganguly 
and Pardesi 2009, 5) 
china’S miliTary modernizaTion 
and iTS effecTS on foreign policy
The rise of  China’s military has been one of  the 
most rapid and impressive in living memory. Ac-
cording to data from the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) military expend-
iture database, China’s total defense spending has in-
creased from $37.04 billion in 2000 to $157.6 billion 
in 2012, an increase of  325%. Unlike India’s mili-
tary modernization process, which has heavily relied 
on foreign arms suppliers for the latest and greatest 
military hardware, China has domestically developed 
and produced many of  their modern weapons sys-
tems. Between 2008 and 2012, Chinese arms exports 
rose by 162%, launching China into fifth place on 
the list of  the world’s largest arms exporters (Ander-
lini and Mallet 2013). The types of  equipment the 
Chinese have been developing are focused on two 
military missions: force projection and asymmetric 
warfare. This is slightly different than India’s focus 
on force projection and the nuclear triad. 
The modernizaTion of The chineSe 
miliTary
China’s military modernization process has focused 
on the development of  weapons systems that are 
designed to seize and maintain control over the sea 
and airspace around China. This is known as an An-
ti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) approach to war-
fare. China’s pursuit of  A2/AD capabilities began 
in earnest in the early 1990s, when it started devot-
ing more of  its defense budget to the modernization 
of  the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In 
1991, around 32% of  China’s defense budget went 
to its navy (Till 2012, 85).  However, the pace of 
naval modernization in the early 1990s was still slow 
and plagued with difficulties. In 1995, China un-
veiled the Luhu, its first indigenously built modern 
destroyer. The ship was
derided as a hodgepodge of  Western 
equipment that was already at least one 
generation behind warships from the de-
veloped world. (Holmes and Yoshihara 
2008, 88) 
During this early phase of  modernization, the PLAN 
tried to bring in technology from states with more 
advanced navies (Kaplan and Peterson 1999, 32). In 
the early 1990s, the PLAN’s modernization push ran 
into difficulties and was more dependent on foreign-
made weapons systems. 
The PLAN’s fortunes began to change in the mid-
1990s, and the fleet went through a period of  rapid 
change from 1996 to 2006. The quantitative change 
of  the fleet during this time period was modest. By 
2006, the PLAN only had nine additional destroy-
ers, eight additional frigates, and five fewer tacti-
cal submarines (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008, 88). 
However, the qualitative changes to the fleet were 
significant. Many of  the PLAN’s outdated major 
surface combatants were decommissioned during 
this period (Kaplan and Peterson 1999, 32). Anoth-
er major qualitative change was a shift away from 
building smaller ships in favor of  fewer, bigger, and 
more powerful ships. Between 1996 and 2006, “five 
entirely new classes, featuring displacements from 
6,000 to nearly 8,000 tons, entered the fleet” (Hol-
mes and Yoshihara 2008, 88). The logic behind this 
decision is that larger ships are both harder to sink 
and have the ability to carry more systems that are 
essential for an A2/AD mission, such as advanced 
radar and area-air-defense missile systems (Till 2012, 
89). These new vessels contributed to a major “bulk-
ing up” of  the PLAN’s capabilities, but there are 
some key capabilities that the PLAN has yet to de-
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velop. In 2006, the PLAN still lacked the command 
and control capabilities, coordination, and targeting 
support systems that qualify a navy as truly modern 
(McVadon 2006, 94). The decade of  1996–2006 saw 
some major qualitative improvements in the PLAN’s 
ship inventory that made up for the number of  out-
dated ships decommissioned and removed from the 
fleet. 
The PLAN has continued its modernization at an 
impressive clip since 2006, and has added many new 
ships and other support systems to its inventory. In 
2012, the PLAN had a total of  78 principle surface 
combatants and 71 submarines in a fleet of  876 ves-
sels (Till 2012, 86). The PLAN has assembled this 
fleet by both importing high-quality ships and weap-
ons systems from abroad (primarily Russia), while 
also developing advanced indigenous systems that 
utilize domestically-produced technology (“The 
PLA Navy - Capacity and Growth.” 2010, 353). The 
story of  the Liaoning is an excellent example of  how 
the PLAN has blended foreign and domestic devel-
opment of  its ships. In 1998, the Chinese purchased 
the Varyag, a Soviet-era Kuznetsov-class aircraft car-
rier, from the Ukraine (Department of  Defense 
2010, 2). The Varyag was delivered essentially as just 
a hull, lacking engines and other critically important 
systems. In 2011, the PLAN completed outfitting 
the vessel with these systems and the Varyag, now 
called the Liaoning, began sea trials (Axe 2011c). In 
September 2012, the Liaoning was commissioned 
into service. By serving on the Liaoning, PLAN ser-
vice members will gain valuable experience in air-
craft carrier operations. There is also evidence that 
the PLAN is developing a program to produce its 
own carrier-based fighter aircraft as well as its own 
aircraft carriers (Till 2012, 90). The Liaoning aircraft 
carrier is an example of  the new major surface ves-
sels that the PLAN has been adding to its fleet in re-
cent years, as well as an example of  how the PLAN 
has blended domestic technology with foreign ship 
design. 
The example of  the Liaoning is becoming the excep-
tion to the rule of  PLAN reliance on foreign-made 
ships. Overall, the PLAN has tried to shift away 
from relying on foreign shipbuilders. Since the late 
1990s, the Chinese government has worked to create 
a domestic defense industrial base by streamlining 
bureaucracy, boosting quality control, and improv-
ing business practices (Department of  Defense 
2010, 43). These policies, combined with the ability 
of  Chinese arms manufacturers to integrate with ci-
vilian firms, have significantly reduced the military’s 
dependence on foreign suppliers. The production 
of  high-quality indigenous vessels like Song-class 
submarines and Luyang II destroyers shows how 
far China’s military industry has advanced since the 
1990s (Till 2012, 86). By 2025, the PLAN’s structure 
will likely include at least two aircraft carriers, six to 
eight new nuclear attack submarines, and several ad-
ditional ballistic missile submarines (Duchatel and 
Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 33). A strong domestic ship-
building industry will be essential to China’s national 
security goals. 
The Chinese military’s pursuit of  A2/AD capabili-
ties has also been manifested in the People’s Lib-
eration Army Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF is 
currently undergoing a transformation from a force 
structured for domestic defense to being able to op-
erate further from China in both offensive and de-
fense roles (Department of  Defense 2010, 25). The 
PLAAF’s airlift and aerial refueling capabilities have 
been especially focused on as being areas ripe for 
modernization. In January 2013, the PLAAF ran a 
successful test flight of  the Xian Y-20 transport air-
craft (Axe 2013). The Y-20 would give the PLAAF a 
much-needed heavy airlift capability, which could be 
used to transport soldiers and equipment in times of 
war and help rescue crews and emergency services 
workers reach natural disaster areas (Department of 
Defense 2010, 34). Aerial refueling enables fighter 
aircraft to stay in the air longer and fly further away 
from bases. In order for China to become a true re-
gional power, it must posses a strong aerial refueling 
capability. In 2011, the PLAAF operated only four-
teen tankers, each carrying 17,000 kg of  fuel. To put 
this in perspective, the US Air Force has more than 
500 tankers, which can carry around 100,000 kg of 
fuel (Axe 2011b). Having strong airlift and aerial re-
fueling capabilities will be an essential part of  the 
PLAAF’s modernization in the coming years. 
In order for China’s A2/AD strategy to be effective, 
it must possess the ability to control the skies and 
deny an enemy air force from operating over China. 
In 2000, the PLAAF had around 2,500 fighter air-
craft, but this number has dwindled as 1960s and 
1970s era fighters like J-6s and J-7s have been retired 
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in favor for more modern planes like J-10s and J-11s 
(Axe 2011a). Before joint producing the J-11 with 
the Russians and developing the J-10, the PLAAF 
purchased Su-27s and Su-30MKK/MKK2s from 
the Russians. By 2007, the PLAAF had 280 of  these 
Russian-made fighters (Gregory 2012, 16). While 
most of  the PLAAF’s newer planes like the J-10 and 
J-11 are technically domestically produced, they are 
based on foreign designs (usually Russian) and are 
either the product of  foreign-assisted development 
and/or licensed production (Liff  and Erickson 
2013, 7). If  current trends in the PLAAF’s acquisi-
tion process continue, then it should have around 
1,000 fighter aircraft by 2020, but most of  them will 
be modern planes (Axe 2011a). Like the PLAN, the 
PLAAF has been forced to retire many of  its out-
dated pieces of  equipment, but both services have 
gained a significant qualitative improvement in their 
capabilities. 
The final major component of  China’s A2/AD 
strategy is its missile arsenal. According to the De-
partment of  Defense, “China has the most active 
land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in 
the world” (Department of  Defense 2010, 1). The 
Chinese military has developed an impressive missile 
arsenal that could be used to strike against enemy 
ships and bases that would otherwise be unreach-
able by the PLAN or PLAAF. Many western ana-
lysts believe that China’s missile arsenal is “directed 
specifically at deterring, delaying, or complicating 
timely and effective American access and interven-
tion” should China make an aggressive move against 
Taiwan (McVadon 2006, 92). Despite the qualitative 
improvements that have been made to the PLAN 
and PLAAF, the two branches still lack the number 
of  planes and ships needed to stop the three to four 
U.S. carrier battle groups that would respond to a 
crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Kim 2012, 364). The Chi-
nese military has turned to missiles to make their 
A2/AD strategy credible. In 2011, the Chinese mili-
tary had as many as 2,000 non-nuclear ballistic and 
cruise missiles (Axe 2011b). In order to make up for 
not having enough ships and planes, the Chinese 
military has invested in building a large missile arse-
nal to ensure that its A2/AD strategy works. 
Some of  the missiles that the Chinese military has de-
veloped have highly advanced targeting systems and 
pose a significant threat to enemy surface warships. 
PLAN has focused on acquiring advanced anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs) and over the horizon tar-
geting systems (OTHT) to engage enemy ships from 
a distance (“The PLA Navy - Capacity and Growth.” 
2010, 353). In addition to these cruise missiles, “the 
Chinese are…developing ballistic missiles with ma-
neuvering warheads and terminal seekers to hit ships 
at sea” (McVadon 2006, 93). One such missile is the 
DF-21, a medium-ranged ballistic missile that has 
been specifically designed to target aircraft carriers. 
If  the DF-21 is deployed successfully, then it would 
be the first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capable 
of  hitting a moving aircraft carrier (Erickson 2010). 
Having the capability to destroy moving aircraft car-
riers without risking dozens of  aircraft and ships in 
a frontal assault gives the Chinese military the ability 
to prevent any large naval force from coming too 
close to its coastline.
The key difference between China and India’s mili-
tary modernization processes is China’s booming 
domestic defense industry. Since the late 1990s, the 
Chinese government has made several policy chang-
es that have helped defense-related companies thrive 
(Department of  Defense 2010, 43). The rapid ex-
pansion of  China’s civilian economy has been very 
beneficial for defense companies. By integrating 
with civilian firms, defense firms have been able to 
improve in the areas of  research and development 
(R&D) and production (Department of  Defense 
2010, 43). One of  the effects of  increased domes-
tic weapons production has been increased arms 
exports. Chinese arms exports “increased a total of 
95 per cent between the 2002–2006 period and the 
2007–2011 period” (Liff  and Erickson 2013, 8). In 
March 2013, China overtook the United Kingdom to 
become the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter (An-
derlini and Mallet 2013). However, the true size of 
China’s domestic defense industry is hard to deter-
mine because the government does not release any 
information about the equipment it produces (Liff 
and Erickson 2013, 7). China’s domestic defense in-
dustry has grown substantially in recent years and is 
much more developed than India’s domestic defense 
industry. 
Despite the growth of  its domestic defense indus-
try, the Chinese military still relies on other states 
for some of  its most advanced equipment. From 
2008–2012, China was the world’s second largest 
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arms importer behind India (Anderlini and Mal-
let 2013). The reason for China’s double status as 
one of  the world’s largest arms exporters and im-
porters has to do with the types of  weapons be-
ing exchanged. Most of  China’s weapons imports 
(69%) come from Russia (Anderlini and Mallet 
2013). These imports represent key technologies 
that China either has not developed or cannot mass-
produce, such as high-performance aircraft engines 
(Liff  and Erickson 2013, 8). The Y-20 transport air-
craft is a good example of  how China’s domestic 
defense industry still relies on foreign suppliers for 
key pieces of  equipment. The Y-20 was made by the 
Xian Aircraft Industrial Corporation, but instead of 
having purpose-designed engines the plane is fitted 
with Russian-made engines (Axe 2013). Chinese de-
fense industries have come a long way in producing 
equipment and creating a strong base for domestic 
weapons manufacturing to build upon, but it still re-
lies on foreign suppliers, especially Russia, for more 
advanced weapons technology. 
The modernization of  China’s armed forces has 
focused on an A2/AD approach to warfare. In the 
event of  a conflict, the PLAN and PLAAF want to 
rapidly seize control of  the sea and sky, respectively, 
and prevent another military from wresting control 
away from them. To this end, the military has ac-
quired modern ships, airplanes, and non-nuclear bal-
listic and cruise missiles to strike enemy ships from 
a distance. China’s land forces have been receiving 
money for modernization as well, but the develop-
ments for the PLAN and PLAAF have been much 
more significant in formulating China’s A2/AD 
strategy. 
The effecTS of china’S miliTary 
modernizaTion on foreign policy 
China’s military modernization has given it a great 
deal of  power in a short amount of  time. This has 
produced two trends in Chinese foreign policy. 
First, the Chinese military and government have 
been more assertive in defending contested territo-
rial claims like islands in the South China Sea and 
the Senkaku Islands which are currently claimed by 
Japan. Second, Chinese foreign policy has become 
much more responsible in a variety of  issue areas, 
especially its relationship with North Korea. China 
has become increasingly willing to contribute to in-
ternational peace and stability in order to maintain a 
status quo that allows it to grow economically and 
to prove that it is a responsible state to the interna-
tional community. 
The growing power of  China’s Navy and Air Force 
has made Chinese claims over disputed territories in 
the East and South China Seas more credible. The 
South China Sea’s  (SCS) strategic importance to the 
Chinese military has to do with energy security and 
international trade. In 2009, the SCS was the world’s 
busiest shipping lane. Over half  of  the world’s su-
pertanker traffic passes through the SCS (Hong 
2009, 42). China is dependent on SCS shipping lanes 
for a large share of  its oil imports. Oil accounts for 
about 20% of  China’s energy consumption, and just 
under half  of  this oil (49%) is shipped from Saudi 
Arabia, Angola, and Iran (Department of  Defense 
2010, 20). There are also substantial oil reserves un-
derneath the SCS. The exact amount of  oil under 
the SCS is not known. A 2011 article in The New York 
Times estimated that the SCS had 61 billion barrels 
worth of  oil and natural gas, with another 54 billion 
barrels that could be discovered (Landler 2011). Ac-
cording to a Chinese estimate cited in a U.S. Energy 
Information Administration Report, there could 
be as many as 213 billion barrels of  oil under the 
SCS (US Energy Information Administration 2008). 
Even though the exact amount of  oil under the SCS 
is not known, it is clear that the state which has con-
trol over the SCS will have a strategic advantage over 
many other states that rely on the SCS as a conduit 
for energy imports. 
The geostrategic importance of  the SCS has prompt-
ed China to take a very active stance in asserting and 
defending its territorial claims. The Strait of  Malacca 
is at the west end of  the SCS. It is considered one of 
China’s sea-lanes of  communication (SLOC) and is 
a major choke point for shipping into the SCS. The 
Chinese government views the presence of  the In-
dian and American navies along this SLOC as a ma-
jor threat to Chinese economic and energy security 
(Malik 2011, 206–207). Within the SCS itself, Chi-
na’s military modernization has spurred what some 
analysts consider to be a naval arms race among 
Southeast Asian claimants to the SCS. The states of 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Bru-
nei have all increased the size of  their navies by ei-
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ther buying or producing modern warships (Klare 
2002, 129–130). However, none of  these states have 
the ability to oppose China unless they take collec-
tive action. In 2011, the member states of  the As-
sociation of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had 
a fleet of  680 fixed-wing aircraft, 412 surface ships 
and eight submarines (Cordesman and Hammond 
2011). This combined force could serve as a deter-
rent to China, but ASEAN is an economic and polit-
ical union, not a mutual defense organization. In the 
absence of  treaty obligation that would draw all of 
ASEAN into conflict with China, should China at-
tack islands in the SCS, the Chinese military has little 
to fear from the other claimants (Dillon 2011, 63). 
The Chinese military has been very active in de-
fending claims to the SCS. In 1992, The National 
People’s Congress adopted the Law of  the PRC 
Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, which effectively codified China’s claim over 
the SCS into domestic law (Holmes and Yoshihara 
2008, 52). After the law was passed, the frequency 
of  clashes between Chinese forces and other claim-
ant states increased significantly. Between 1992 
and 2002, there were fifteen reported incidents of 
military clashes in the SCS, ten of  which China was 
involved in. A period of  relative stability began in 
2002 when ASEAN and China released the Declara-
tion on the Conduct of  Parties in the South China 
Sea (DOC). The DOC established a status quo that 
the claimants would seek diplomatic solutions to ter-
ritorial disputes (Department of  Defense 2010, 39). 
However, Chinese efforts to modernize their navy 
have begun to upset the balance of  power, and the 
stability that was established by the DOC is begin-
ning to strain. The SCS falls into the same category 
of  geopolitical interest areas as Tibet and Taiwan 
for China’s government, considered to be “core in-
terests” (Malik 2011, 24). The Chinese military has 
used force in the past to assert China’s claims over 
Tibet and Taiwan, so the use of  force in the SCS is a 
very real possibility. 
Recent developments in the SCS have confirmed its 
importance to China’s foreign policy. According to 
Duchatel and Sheldon-Duplaix:
Gaining effective control over its claimed 
Exclusive Economic Zone. (EEZ) in 
the…South China Sea stands out as a 
priority and…a guiding principle…for 
China’s maritime policies. (Duchatel and 
Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 33)
The acquisition of  the Liaoning aircraft carrier gives 
the PLAN the ability to put strike aircraft anywhere 
in the SCS, giving them a significant military advan-
tage over all of  the other claimants, none of  which 
possess an aircraft carrier (McVadon 2006, 102). 
The acquisition of  more attack submarines and larg-
er surface combatants also make for a more threat-
ening PLAN presence in the SCS. The PLAN’s ex-
panded submarine fleet would likely operate with the 
Liaoning and its aircraft, with the carrier providing air 
cover and defense for the submarines which would 
engage enemy ships with anti-ship missiles (Ducha-
tel and Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 35).
Actions by Chinese forces in the SCS over the last 
four years have ratcheted up tension. Some analysts 
believe that China’s foreign policy towards the SCS 
took an assertive turn beginning in 2009 (Kim 2012, 
362). There were several incidences involving Amer-
ican and Chinese naval forces in 2009. In the spring, 
PLAN ships harassed the USNS Impeccable and 
Victorious, two surveillance ships. In June, a PLAN 
submarine collided with a sonar array towed by the 
USNS John McCain (Dillon 2011, 56). In 2010, a De-
fense Department report to Congress stated that a 
new PLAN base on Hainan Island was “essentially 
complete”:
The base is large enough to accommo-
date a mix of  attack and ballistic missile 
submarines and advanced surface com-
batants. (Department of  Defense 2010, 
2)
In 2012, a PLAN frigate ran aground on a disputed 
island, “raising regional suspicions that Beijing was 
trying to bolster its claim to the entire South China 
Sea” (Kurlantzick 2012). Chinese officials have also 
ramped up rhetoric about their claims to disputed is-
lands, and the government has repeatedly sent ships 
close to areas claimed by other states. 
Chinese actions in the SCS have been more aggres-
sive and assertive in recent years, but in many other 
issue areas Chinese foreign policy has become more 
tempered as its military has modernized. China’s 
“fourth generation” of  leaders (Hu Jintao era) “pur-
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sued a [foreign] policy of  ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peace-
ful development’ that relies more on reassurance 
and incentives than on coercion or power politics” 
(Wang 2011, 441). One major change to China’s for-
eign policy that stems from the “peaceful rise” mod-
el has been the way China interacts with multilateral 
institutions. The Chinese government has realized 
that engaging these organizations “helps promote 
the country’s trade and security interests” (Wang 
2011, 442). The modernization of  China’s military 
did not cause Chinese foreign policy to undergo 
this shift by itself; rather it was a piece of  a larger 
move towards multilateralism that was encouraged 
by China’s overall development. In order to gain the 
trust and respect of  the international community, 
the Chinese government must use its new military 
power responsibly. 
In recent years, the most major strategic change in 
Chinese foreign policy has to do with its relationship 
with North Korea. China’s relationship with North 
Korea began in 1950, when a nascent Communist 
China sought the support of  the Soviet Union as a 
counterweight to the United States. By supporting 
North Korea in the Korean War, the Chinese gov-
ernment hoped to:
demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow and 
vividly underscore the threat the United 
States posed to all socialist states. (A. 
Goldstein 2006, 133)
Throughout the Cold War, China was a major ally 
of  North Korea, and provided North Korea with 
significant economic and military support to prop 
it up as a buffer against American interests in East 
Asia. During the 1960s and 1970s, “several hundred 
North Korean experts were trained in […] nuclear 
technologies in China” (Malik 2011, 237). North 
Korea’s arsenal of  ballistic missiles include some 
models, like the Taepo Dong, that have their origins 
in Chinese ballistic missile technology (Malik 2011, 
237). However, the main supplier of  conventional 
weapons to North Korea was the Soviet Union. Af-
ter the Soviet Union broke up, the Russian govern-
ment attempted to remain active in North Korea, 
but a significant economic crunch in the mid-1990s 
severely limited the possibility of  continued Russian 
support (Harada 1997, 68). 
China filled the economic void left after the collapse 
of  the Soviet Union, helping keep North Korea’s 
economy afloat after the end of  the Cold War in ad-
dition to providing North Korea with badly needed 
energy resources. Before the Soviet Union collapsed, 
it was North Korea’s major economic provider. By 
the end of  1990, North Korea owed about $4 bil-
lion to the Soviets (Lee 1996, 138). Once Soviet eco-
nomic assistance dried up, North Korea relied on 
China for most of  its economic aid. In 1993, just 
three years after Soviet assistance stopped, China’s 
share in North Korea’s total foreign trade was 34% 
(Lee 1996, 139). China’s commitment to North Ko-
rea’s energy security also has a long history. In Janu-
ary 1976, the China-Korea Friendship Pipeline was 
completed, supplying North Korea with oil at below-
market prices. Chinese engineers and technicians 
helped build North Korea’s energy infrastructure by 
constructing oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and 
other related structures (Lee 1996, 134–135). North 
Korea’s reliance on China as an energy supplier has 
increased dramatically since the Cold War. In 2011, 
“China alone account[ed] for 70% to 90% of  North 
Korea’s fuel imports” (Malik 2011, 253).  
In 2010, China’s response to two major provoca-
tions by North Korea indicated the importance of 
North Korea to China’s foreign policy. In March 
2010, a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, was 
sunk off  the coast of  North Korea. Once North 
Korea was named as the culprit in the sinking, Chi-
na’s Premier Wen Jiabao offered condolences for the 
sailors killed, but stopped short of  criticizing North 
Korea for its action (Sang-hun 2010). The Chinese 
government reacted similarly to the bombardment 
of  the island of  Yeonpyeong by North Korean artil-
lery in November 2010. China’s unwillingness to put 
pressure on North Korea for its aggressive actions 
in 2010 could be connected to North Korea’s Rajin 
naval base. The North Korean government has al-
lowed Chinese military forces to use the base, giv-
ing China a naval presence in the Sea of  Japan for 
the first time (Malik 2011, 270). Also in 2010, Wen 
Jiabao offered a $10 billion aid package to North 
Korea, which undermined UN sanctions designed 
to prevent North Korea from receiving international 
assistance (Malik 2011, 270–271). 
Given the long history of  political, economic, and 
military support that China has given North Korea, 
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China’s reaction to North Korea’s successful nuclear 
test in February 2013 should have been minimal. 
Instead, the Chinese government has been active in 
both denouncing the nuclear test and has played a 
major role in bringing multilateral pressure against 
the North Korean government. Less than one 
month after the test, the UN Security Council unan-
imously approved new economic sanctions against 
North Korea that were drafted by the U.S. and China 
(Gladstone and Sanger 2013). This is not the first 
time that China has supported sanctions against 
North Korea in response to nuclear tests. Success-
ful nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 caused the Secu-
rity Council to approve sanctions, and both times 
China voted in favor (Lim 2013). However, the 2013 
sanctions seem to have produced a much stronger 
reaction from the Chinese government and could 
indicate a major shift in Chinese policy towards 
North Korea. According to an article in The New 
York Times, “A more heightened debate about North 
Korea is now swirling around China’s foreign policy 
circles” (Perlez 2013). One side of  this debate has 
argued that China should cooperate with the Unit-
ed States to curb North Korea’s nuclear program, 
which would be a major step in proving to the world 
that China is a responsible player in the international 
system. 
While it is too soon to definitively state whether or 
not China will substantially change its foreign pol-
icy towards North Korea, there are some promis-
ing signs that it will keep up the pressure to bring 
the nuclear program to heel. On May 7, 2013, the 
state-controlled Bank of  China declared that it had 
ended all dealings with North Korea’s Foreign Trade 
Bank, a “key North Korean bank” (Bradsher and 
Cumming-Bruce 2013). The Chinese government 
has encouraged state-controlled enterprises, which 
make up a large portion of  the Chinese economy 
and strategic industries, to cease dealing with North 
Korea to ensure that the latest round of  interna-
tional sanctions have more weight. According to a 
Chinese professor of  Korean Studies at Fudan Uni-
versity: 
this appears to be a step by the govern-
ment to show that it’s willing to coop-
erate with the international community. 
(Bradsher and Cumming-Bruce 2013)
The Bank of  China’s decision to close its doors to 
North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank is a major sym-
bolic act, showing how serious the Chinese govern-
ment is about becoming a responsible member in 
the international system. 
It is too early to tell whether or not China’s foreign 
policy towards North Korea will be significantly 
changed in the long term, but China’s actions in re-
sponse to the February 2013 nuclear tests have been 
the harshest to date. This indicates a willingness on 
the part of  China to be a more responsible mem-
ber of  the international community. As China mod-
ernizes militarily and economically, it will likely be 
faced with more situations when it will have to make 
a trade-off  and follow the will of  the international 
community instead of  acting solely in accordance 
with its interests. The ability to compromise national 
goals for the sake of  international peace and stabil-
ity is the mark of  a great power. China is developing 
the military of  a great power, but it will not be a 
true great power until it uses its military and political 
clout to create and protect a positive environment 
for all states to exist within. 
an aSian armS race?
The question of  whether or not China and India 
are engaged in an arms race is an important one to 
answer. Arms races breed instability as two states 
develop deadlier weapons in an attempt to stay one 
step ahead of  each other. What starts as two states 
trying to secure their own survival and protection 
against one another usually ends in warfare as any 
miscommunication or misperception can rapidly es-
calate into war. State resources get focused on mak-
ing better weapons and not on other causes like pro-
viding healthcare and education to its citizens (Till 
2013). Thankfully, China and India do not appear 
to be engaged in an arms race. Instead, both states 
are going through a “natural” phase as they acquire 
militaries that better reflect their growing power and 
importance in the international system. 
Although India and China do view each other with 
suspicion and consider one another to be rivals, their 
main threat perceptions are directed elsewhere. This 
is reflected in the types of  weapons both states are 
acquiring. India’s military is geared toward conven-
tional power projection, while China’s military is 
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specifically developing capabilities that are focused 
on an A2/AD war fighting strategy. If  the two states 
were in an arms race with one another, then they 
would be trying to develop capabilities that coun-
tered one another, but this is not happening. The 
political and military leadership of  both states have 
made efforts to increase cooperation and reduce the 
chances that a dispute could get out of  hand and 
flare up into all-out war. Arms races in the past have 
tended to eat up a large portion of  state resources, 
but both China and India have experienced such 
massive economic growth that military spending 
is taking up a very small percent of  their national 
spending. The absence of  an arms race between 
India and China neither removes the possibility of 
armed conflict nor prevents strategic rivalry, but it 
does lessen the prospect of  war and allows more op-
portunities for cooperation to exist that can hope-
fully lead to a friendly relationship between the two 
states. 
India and China are not in an arms race because they 
do not perceive one another as their primary threat. 
Of  course, two states do not have to perceive of 
one another as their primary threat in order to be 
in an arms race. However, threat perceptions play 
a big role in the types of  military capabilities that 
states develop. A state will not put that much effort 
into developing weapons technology and military 
doctrine to counter another state that it does not 
perceive as a threat. If  the balance of  threat theory 
is applied to the Sino-Indian relationship, it is clear 
that while both states perceive each other as poten-
tial threats, the states they perceive as greater threats 
are not one another. Additionally, both states have 
engaged in activities that have reduced their threat 
perception of  one another. 
Balance of  threat theory is a modification to balance 
of  power theory, which are both affiliated with the 
Neorealist School of  international relations theory. 
According to neorealists, states are constantly trying 
to tip the balance of  power in their favor in order 
to ensure their survival in an anarchic international 
system (Mearsheimer 2010, 80). In this system there 
is a “perpetual security competition,” which exists 
in part because states are not fully sure about the 
intentions of  other states (Mearsheimer 2010, 81). 
Adherents to a balance of  power view of  the world 
focus most on the “physical” power capabilities of 
states, such as the size of  a state’s military or the 
economy (Wohlforth 1999, 10). The problem of 
focusing solely on power capabilities as a predictor 
of  state behavior is that it ignores important factors 
that determine state behavior. One such factor is 
how states perceive the intentions of  other states, or 
the “threat” that other states pose. In 1985, Stephen 
M. Walt started to take threat into account when he 
asserted that states will balance “against the threats 
posed by the power, proximity, offensive capabili-
ties, and intentions of  others” (Walt 1985, 18 empha-
sis added). 
Walt examined the behavior of  the Soviet Union 
and alliance formation of  states to explain how bal-
ance of  threat theory explains state behavior. In 
response to a powerful economic and military alli-
ance headed by the United States, the Soviet Union 
began devoting considerable economic resources 
to its military. The military then developed a force 
posture and doctrine that put emphasis on offensive 
capabilities. This focus on offense “increase[ed] the 
level of  threat that Soviet neighbors perceive” (Walt 
1985, 37). This caused many of  the Soviet Union’s 
neighbors to be wary and actually drove them closer 
to the United States and its allies. Soviet aggression 
in Afghanistan during the 1980s, as well as heavy-
handed policies in Eastern Europe, caused many 
independent neighboring states to see the Soviet 
Union as a threat (Walt 1985, 37). Threat percep-
tions were therefore a major factor in determining 
the behavior of  weaker states near the Soviet Union. 
These states feared the Soviet Union because of  the 
Soviet’s aggressive foreign policy, and many of  these 
states began forming closer relationships with states 
that were opposed to the Soviet Union. 
In the case of  Sino-Indian relations, both states per-
ceive each other to be a threat to some degree. A use-
ful benchmark for determining threat perceptions is 
examining what strategic and military experts think 
of  another state’s military modernization process. 
India’s military modernization began receiving at-
tention in Chinese academic journals in 2000, the 
year when President Bill Clinton visited India. Soon 
after Clinton’s visit, the United States began lifting 
sanctions on India that had been in place since 1974, 
which allowed the United States to reemerge in the 
Indian defense market (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 
12). From 2000 onward,
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there were fewer dismissive or negative 
articles within the Chinese media and 
government statements on India. (Saal-
man 2011a, 90)
Another important feature of  the articles is their 
length. Chinese analysts have written many long ar-
ticles on Indian military modernization since 2000, 
with peaks in 2005 and 2009 (Saalman 2011a, fig. 2). 
These longer articles allow for more in-depth analy-
sis, indicating that Chinese analysts are taking the In-
dian modernization more seriously. Great attention 
has been paid to India’s military development, but 
Chinese analysts have not yet designated India as a 
major threat. Instead, India is regarded as an ambi-
tious strategic rival, a state that is capable of  much 
but does not yet strike fear in the hearts of  Chinese 
defense planners and therefore does not need to be 
balanced against at the moment. 
The Indian strategic community is more wary of 
China’s military modernization and strategic goals. 
After the Sino-Indian War, China became India’s 
primary security threat, which caused the Indian 
government and military to begin balancing against 
China. For example, the Indian nuclear weapons 
program started after the Chinese successfully tested 
a nuclear device in 1964 (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
98). However, China ceased to be the primary threat 
to India’s security in 1965, when Pakistan fought its 
second war with India. For most of  the twentieth 
century, India’s military capabilities and doctrinal 
thinking has been focused on the threat emanating 
from Pakistan (Sahgal 2012, 284). This view of  Pa-
kistan as India’s primary threat has begun to change. 
Reports and directives written by Indian strategic 
planners in the last five years have paid more atten-
tion to China’s military modernization and strategic 
goals. The defense minister’s 2010 operational direc-
tive, 
asks the Indian military to prepare for 
a full-spectrum war [with China] that 
could include WMDs. (Sahgal 2012, 284) 
Some Indian strategists believe that competition 
between India and China is a zero-sum game. This 
makes Chinese hegemony in Asia unacceptable, as 
it would prevent India from achieving great power 
status (Wang 2011, 460). Despite the characteriza-
tion of  China as a major threat by the Indian strate-
gic community, Indian foreign policy towards China 
has focused on engagement, lowering tensions, and 
building “a win-win transactional relationship that 
underscores cooperation and downplays competi-
tion” (Sahgal 2012, 286). Although many prominent 
figures in Indian strategic circles view the military 
rise of  China as a threat, there is a desire to find ways 
to cooperate with China and reduce mutual threat 
perceptions while maintaining Indian strategic au-
tonomy. 
The Indian and Chinese political leaderships real-
ize that cooperation in multilateral institutions and 
person-to-person contacts can be excellent ways of 
opening up lines of  communication, reducing threat 
perceptions, and making conflict less likely. In 2006, 
the Chinese invited India to become a member of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
which “seeks to promote regional economic and se-
curity cooperation in Central Asia (Malik 2011, 306). 
The Indian government initially refused China’s of-
fer, but in June 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh attended an SCO summit. The Indian govern-
ment began reconsidering full membership in the 
SCO to move closer to regional powers after the 
Obama administration began tilting more towards 
Pakistan to help with the war in Afghanistan (Malik 
2011, 308). The SCO provides India and China with 
a place to enter into strategic dialogue and address 
security concerns (Sahgal 2012, 304). 
Small improvements to diplomatic relations have 
been made via high-level visits and simple displays 
of  goodwill. For example, in 2009, the Indian and 
Chinese premiers established a hotline between 
them to deal with political crises before they escalat-
ed out of  control (Joshi 2011a, 572). In April 2013, 
small incursions by Chinese military forces across 
the Indian border near Ladakh caused tensions to 
rise, but both governments quickly downplayed al-
legations that these incursions marked a significant 
deterioration of  relations (Guha and Spegele 2013). 
It is not clear whether or not the 2009 hotline was 
used during the April 2013 incidents, but the fact 
that both the Indian and Chinese governments were 
quick to downplay the incidents shows a desire for 
stability in bilateral relations and a willingness to rap-
idly bring potential political disputes under control 
before a situation can escalate. 
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The types of  military capabilities being purchased 
and developed by India and China reveal their pri-
mary strategic goals and offer insight into the ques-
tion of  an arms race. The Indian military is focused 
on building capabilities that would allow it to project 
power throughout the Indian Ocean region (Saal-
man 2011a, 99–100). This has placed the focus of 
military modernization on acquiring modern ships 
and aircraft. Meanwhile, China’s military has been 
developing technology for an A2/AD strategy. Chi-
na’s massive arsenal of  non-nuclear ballistic missiles, 
which includes new anti-ship ballistic missiles like 
the DF-21, would be able to destroy large surface 
ships like aircraft carriers (Erickson 2010). Instead 
of  preparing its military to fight a war against India, 
China’s military is being built up to counter Ameri-
can intervention in the East and South China Seas 
(McVadon 2006, 96). Both India and China have 
been developing very similar weapons technology 
as part of  their military modernization process, but 
neither state is attempting to specifically counter the 
capabilities of  the other. 
concluSion
Despite their long history of  mistrust and linger-
ing suspicions of  one another’s intentions, India 
and China are not engaged in an arms race. Both 
states have invested considerable resources into the 
modernization of  their militaries, but this is merely 
a reflection of  each states’ growing power. As China 
and India have grown politically and economically, 
they have tried to create militaries that reflect their 
status. Power-projection has been the major focus of 
the military modernization in India, as it seeks to be-
come the predominant power in the Indian Ocean. 
China’s military modernization has focused on de-
veloping A2/AD capabilities, which would allow its 
navy and air force to rapidly take control of  the sea 
and sky close to China. At this point, China lacks the 
support capabilities to carry out the A2/AD strategy 
far from China’s territorial waters, making serious 
Chinese military involvement in the Indian Ocean 
unsustainable.
Indian and Chinese officials should continue to build 
on the steps that have already been made towards 
normalizing relations and reducing threat percep-
tions. High-level diplomatic visits, regular contact, 
and joint exercises between militaries, as well as en-
suring open lines of  communication during poten-
tial crises will go a long way in clarifying each state’s 
strategic goals and will make the chance of  war less 
likely. Both states should also be encouraged to take 
active roles in peacekeeping missions, disaster relief, 
and counter-terrorism/anti-piracy missions that are 
organized by multilateral organizations like the UN. 
If  India and China can use their military power in 
these issue areas, they would be helping other states 
as well as themselves and would create a positive 
model for developing states to follow. Rivalry be-
tween rising great powers cannot be eliminated, but 
if  China and India make the effort to cooperate and 
reduce their threat to one another, then a hopeful 
model of  great power ascension can be created.
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